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Paper IP-KRYPTO cipher machine
for military use
Mariusz Borowski and Grzegorz Łabuzek
Abstract—Polish military IP networks can be effectively and
cheaply secured by IP-KRYPTO cipher machines which are
developed in the Military Communication Institute. The co-
operation with Polish manufacturers – Optimus and ABA
Kraków and the usage of COTS elements and ideas speed
up the research and development works. The IP-KRYPTO
cipher machine will be used for securing the “SECRET” data
so it must be certified to fulfill E3 ITSEC evaluation crite-
ria. This requirement generates additional challenges in the
development process when the COTS elements are to be im-
plemented.
Keywords— IPsec standards, ITSEC evaluation criteria.
1. Introduction
Military computer networks, among other things, need the
security cryptographic services which can be implemented
at several layers in a network infrastructure. Military in-
stitutions have used link-level encryption for years. In the
method every communications link is protected with a pair
of encrypting devices – one on each end of the link. While
this method provides excellent data confidentiality between
two crypto devices, other cryptographic services are inac-
cessible. Of course, this method does not work at all in the
public networks, where few of the intermediate links are
accessible or trusted to the user.
2. Usage of IPsec standards as a COTS
development idea
The Internet Protocol security (IPsec) is a framework of
open standards for ensuring secure private communications
over IP networks. Based on standards developed by the In-
ternet Engineering Task Force (IETF), IPsec ensures con-
fidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data communica-
tions across the public IP network.
The concept of a “Security Association” (SA) is fundamen-
tal to IPsec [2]. SA is a simple “connection” that affords
security services to the traffic carried by it. Two types of SA
are defined: transport mode and tunnel mode.
The transport mode SA is a security association between
two hosts. In IPv4, a transport mode security protocol
header appears immediately after the IP header and any
options, and before any higher layer protocols (e.g., TCP
or UDP).
The tunnel mode SA is essentially an SA applied to an
IP tunnel. Whenever either end of a security association is
a security gateway, the SA must be the tunnel mode. For the
tunnel mode SA, there is an “outer” IP header that specifies
the IPsec processing destination, plus an “inner” IP header
that specifies (apparently) the ultimate destination for the
packet.
The Internet Protocol security is based on the following
two protocols:
– Authentication Header protocol (AH) [3],
– Encapsulation Security Payload protocol (ESP) [4].
The AH protocol provides integrity and authentication ser-
vices, while the ESP protocol delivers mainly confidential-
ity. These protocols may be applied alone or in combination
with each other to provide desirable set of security services.
Each protocol can be used in the transport mode and the
tunnel mode.
The encrypted packets look like ordinary IP packets
(Fig. 1), they can easily be routed through any IP network,
such as the Internet, without any changes to the intermedi-
ate networking equipment.
Fig. 1. Appling ESP to a packet in tunnel mode.
The only devices that know about the encryption are the
end points. This feature greatly reduces both the imple-
mentation and management costs.
3. The TCE 621 IP Crypto Device –
the prototype
According to the COTS strategy the IPsec standards were
implemented in military IP crypto devices by many manu-
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facturers. One of such approach is the TCE 621 IP Crypto
Device (Fig. 2) developed by THALES Communications
company which was approved for securing NATO IP net-
works.
Fig. 2. The TCE 621 IP Crypto Device.
The TCE 621 is inserted between a host (end system) or
a company network and the IP network. This is used to
establish virtual private networks (VPN) solutions, or to
provide end-to-end protection of the communications be-
tween single hosts. The TCE 621 protects the communica-
tions between hosts by adding end-to-end security services
to the IP protocol. All security services are provided by
the IPsec ESP protocol [4] as specified by IETF.
The TCE 621 provides:
– NATO approved cryptographic algorithms;
– a 10 megabits per second Ethernet interface;
– security for between 500 and 900 IP datagrams per
second, depending on pocket size;
– up to 1000 security associations;
– work in a net consisted of up to 1000 such devices;
– audit support and centralized management;
– protection against electromagnetic emanation accord-
ing to AMSG 720B;
– ruggerized, temper resistant shelter.
The Polish army is not equipped with the IP crypto ci-
pher machines of such functionality but it needs them. The
Military Communication Institute, which has long tradition
in building the cryptographic devices, starts research and
the development process. For efficiency and the time and
money saving we decided to use some of the COTS com-
ponents and ideas.
4. The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate –
the first Polish approximation
Polish computer companies, Optimus and ABA Kraków,
developed and introduced the Optimus ABA IPSec Gate
crypto devices which are based on IPsec standards.
The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate (Fig. 3) uses exclusively
well-tried standard PC hardware which is cost-effective and
deliverable in the long term. Moreover, the cipher machine
can be integrated into every underlying IP-based IT infras-
tructure.
The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate is based on a specially min-
imized and hardened Linux operating system with imple-
mentation of IPsec standards named FreeS/Wan. All soft-
ware is stored on flash RAM with manipulation protection.
Moreover the software integrity is checked during the sys-
tem start up, and in small regular time periods.
Fig. 3. The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate.
The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate provides the strongest en-
cryption technology available on the commercial market,
using concurrent 3DES (168-bit key) and Rijndael – AES
(256-bit) algorithms as standard offerings. The unit em-
ploys the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1 and SHA-2), as
well as Diffie-Hellman and Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
protocols [6] to perform authentication and automatic ex-
change of a key material.
Supported standards:
• [2], [3], [4] – main IPsec standards;
• [5], [6], [7] – IPsec standards supported session keys
establishing methods;
• RFC 2403, The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP
and AH;
• RFC 2404, The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP
and AH;
• RFC 2104, HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message
Authentication Code;
• RFC 2451, The ESP CBC Mode Cipher Algo-
rithms;
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• RFC 2408, Internet Security Association and Key
Management Protocol;
• RFC 3173, IP Payload Compression Protocol
(IPComp);
• RFC 2394, IP Payload Compression Using
DEFLATE.
The throughput of data depends on the selected cryp-
tographic algorithm. The data throughput of the Opti-
mus ABA IPSec Gate is scaled with the clock rate of
the underlying processor hardware and achieves up to
90 Mbit/s with AES on a Intel Celeron 1.7 GHz proces-
sor. It supports dial-up functions (PPP) via ISDN terminal
adapters, analogue modems, DSL and GSM/GPRS mobile
phones.
The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate was certified for secur-
ing the “RESTRICTED” data by the national security au-
thority according to the “Protection of Classified Informa-
tion Act”.
5. The IP-KRYPTO cipher machine
research process
The Military Communication Institute in cooperation with
Optimus and ABA Kraków companies is developing an IP-
KRYPTO cipher machine for use by the Polish army. The
cipher machine is designated for securing the “SECRET”
data in the military and government IP networks; therefore
it must be worked out and produced to fulfill the ITSEC
evaluation criteria.
The IP-KRYPTO cipher machine has to fulfill the E3 IT-
SEC evaluation criteria, but the cryptographic algorithms
have to fulfill E6 criteria. For rapid development we de-
cided to use COTS technologies and equipments. The tar-
get of the evaluation (TOE) [8] which satisfies E3 criteria
must be prepared in the development process with:
– security target for the TOE;
– informal description of the architecture of the TOE;
– informal description of the detailed design;
– test documentation;
– library of test programs and tools used for testing the
TOE;
– source code or hardware drawings for all security
enforcing and security relevant components;
– informal description of correspondence between
source code or hardware drawings and the detailed
design.
While the use of IPsec standards as an example of COTS
ideas is consistent with the shown criteria in regard to
the deliberated specification, the implementation of soft-
ware modules without the source code is unacceptable.
The main tasks in the research process:
a) designing fast and secure national cryptographic al-
gorithms with a suitable documentation;
b) implementation of algorithms in the COTS imple-
mentation of IPsec standards named FreeS/WAN;
c) designing a secure and effective key establishing
method;
d) designing a secure and temper resistant keying mod-
ule;
e) designing an IP-KRYPTO motherboard with an ap-
propriate powerful processor and solved thermal
problems;
f) designing a temper resistant and satisfying lack of
electromagnetic emanation (AMSG 720B) shelter;
g) designing a shelter and a motherboard which satisfy
environmental and mechanical demands;
h) preparing a network planning and key generation sta-
tion.
Some of the aforementioned challenges will be discussed
more precisely here.
The IP-KRYPTO cipher machine demands fast and secure
national cryptographic algorithms. The IPsec standards are
open and suitable for the implementation of any national
algorithms instead of those shown for the commercial use.
The new national algorithms were designed in the Mili-
tary Communication Institute. In addition to the security
features also their speed of work was important because
the IP-KRYPTO must support at least a 10 Mbit/s Ethernet
interface.
The IP-KRYPTO cipher machine needs a motherboard
with an appropriate powerful processor and the solved ther-
mal problems. The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate manufac-
tured by our partners uses exclusively the well-tried stan-
dard PC hardware which is cost-effective but this commer-
cial equipment cannot be implemented in the military prod-
ucts. We decided to use a hardened industrial standard
PC motherboard. The motherboard provides 10/100 Mbit/s
Fast Ethernet Ports, a socket 478 processor and DiskOn-
Module like flash memory on the board. It also supports
optional IPsec encryption accelerator which uses commer-
cial algorithms according IPsec standards. We did not de-
cide to design national VLSI IPsec module because of small
scale of production, costs and absence of trusted manu-
factures (national algorithms will have to be implemented
in it). All IPsec operations are software implemented
and executed by a fast processor. Computational power
of the processor is very important but it causes problems
with freezing all modules on the motherboard. Freezing
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demands are additionally complicated by the needed lack
of electromagnetic emanation of the cipher machine. Me-
chanical and environmental exposures also must be taken
into consideration.
The source code or hardware drawings for all security en-
forcing and the security relevant components have to be
shown in the certification process so the IP-KRYPTO ci-
pher machine operates under control of the Linux oper-
ating system. The Linux OS is the open source operat-
ing system and everyone wise has an access to its code.
The Linux OS used in the IP-KRYPTO crypto machine is
integrated with software implementation of IPsec standards
named FreeS/WAN. All security services are provided by
the IPsec ESP protocol in the tunnel mode. New func-
tions have been added to the standard FreeS/WAN soft-
ware. The functions concern the ability of connecting
with the device located behind a Network Address Trans-
lator (NAT-Traversal) and Dead Peer Detection (DPD).
Additionally the IP-KRYPTO software is integrated with
a software firewall based on iptables with an automatic con-
figuration option. This configuration is created upon con-
figuration parameters for maximizing security and does not
reduce functionality. By default the firewall blocks all pack-
ets except packets moving in the IPsec tunnel. All appli-
cations have been compiled with the use of Gnu Compiler
Collection (GCC) with stack-smashing protector. It is an
extension for protecting applications from stack-smashing
attacks. The protection is realized by buffer overflow de-
tection and the variable reordering feature to avoid the cor-
ruption of pointers.
Key establishing methods for IPsec are shown in [6].
Phase 1 is where two ISAKMP peers establish a secure,
authenticated channel with which to communicate. In the
phase the Diffie-Hellman protocol is used for establishing
a common secret. The common secret is used in Phase 2
for establishing cryptographic keys. The IP-KRYPTO ci-
pher machine will secure the “SECRET” data, so the data
must stay secret by the next fifty years. In that case we
have a well known cryptographic theorem: “If the Diffie-
Hellman protocol is secure than the scheme is secure”.
A well known method of securing the Diffie-Hellman pro-
tocol is using more numerous GF∗(p) or transforming the
protocol to the group of points on elliptic curves. These
examples are shown in [7] and they are suitable for the
commercial use where such a long time for securing the
data is not required. The security of the Diffie-Hellman
protocol is based on the difficulty of solving a discrete
logarithms problem, other well known public key algo-
rithms (for example RSA) are based on the difficulty of
number factoring. The security of the transformations is
based on mathematical problems and computational com-
plexity. But an adversary is able to record all exchanges
between two IP-KRYPTO devices and wait (it has fifty
years) until new mathematical or computational methods
are achieved. Thus a simple copy of the standard [6]
in the developing the IP-KRYPTO cipher machine is not
available.
The IP-KRYPTO cipher machine needs a secure and tem-
per resistant keying module. The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate
used a Flash RAM for hiding the keys and configuration.
All data on the Flash RAM are ciphered. This is an excel-
lent example of using the COTS technology which is fast,
cost effective and suitable for securing the “RESTRICTED”
data. The requirements for securing the “SECRET” data
demand that the key module must have a temper resistant
shelter and support an emergency clearing function execut-
ing without outer power supply.
The last step in the developing the IP-KRYPTO cipher
machine will be creating a network planning and key gen-
eration station. The main goal of the station is prepa-
ration of the configuration data and cryptographic keys
for all IP-KRYPTO machines and filling their keying
modules.
6. Summary
In the paper we showed the IP-KRYPTO research process.
If a crypto device must be used for securing the “SECRET”
data, then special requirements must be fulfilled. Usage
of COTS technologies and equipments is suitable in de-
veloping crypto devices for securing the “RESTRICTED”
data. Such techniques implemented in the devices dedi-
cated for securing higher clause data need an extremely
cautious, well prepared and experienced developing team.
The simplest way is with the use of COTS ideas and
standards but military equipments must fulfill additional
mechanical, environmental and electromagnetic emanation
criteria.
IP-KRYPTO cipher machines demand also a network plan-
ning and key generation station. At the end of the research
process the prototype of the cipher machine with the station
must be certified by the national security authority accord-
ing to the “Protection of Classified Information Act”.
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